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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the passing of Dean Gabriel M. Wilner, the University of Georgia 
School of Law, the American Society of International Law, and the 
international law community at large lost a great scholar and friend.  I 
worked with Dean Wilner over the years on many issues involving various 
aspects of international law, none, however, as special as the conference we 
held in 2003 for the Dean Rusk Center.  This conference, The Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship – Aviation Policy:  Clearing the Way to a More Open Market,1 
was a remarkable gathering of leading experts in the field of aviation from 
the private, public, and academic sectors.  We spent three exciting days 
discussing aviation liberalization.  Realizing the importance of the 
transatlantic relationship to both the United States and Europe, the 
conference strove to move the argument of aviation liberalization forward.  
In large part due to Dean Wilner’s efforts, I think the conference was a great 
success. 
Several years later, some of the same experts in attendance at the 
conference were successful in reaching the historic U.S.–EU Air Transport 
Agreement on April 30, 2007 (the 2007 Agreement).2  This Agreement, 
which culminated four years of sometimes contentious negotiations between 
the two parties, reduced restrictions on flights between the United States and 
the European Union, promoted the efficiency of European operators by 
permitting mergers among them, and overrode all existing bilateral aviation 
treaties between individual members of the European Union and the United 
States.  The 2007 Agreement was a monumental step toward eventual 
worldwide open skies, although next steps remained to be resolved.  Merely 
three years later, in March 2010, the same parties signed a Memorandum of 
Consultation, further advancing liberalization in the trans-Atlantic aviation 
market.3 
                                                                                                                   
 1 GABRIEL WILNER ET AL., THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP—AVIATION POLICY: 
CLEARING THE WAY TO A MORE OPEN MARKET (2003), available at http://digitalcommons. 
law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=rusk_oc. 
 2 Air Transport Agreement, U.S.–EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter 2007 
Agreement].  A copy of the U.S.–EU Agreement, along with other significant documents 
concerning negotiations, is available at  Air Transport Agreements, E, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/e/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).  
 3 Memorandum of Consultations on a Protocol to Amend the Air Transp. Agreement 
Between the U.S. and the European Cmty. and Its Member States (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
2010 Agreement], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139411.pdf. 
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Dean Wilner was proud of the part the Dean Rusk Center played in helping 
to advance the cause of international aviation liberalization.  This Article is 
dedicated to my mentor, colleague, and good friend, Gabriel Wilner. 
In this Article I will show that international air transport systems play a 
key role in modern economies, and the U.S.–EU trans-Atlantic market has 
always been a market leader.  To this end I will: provide a brief historical 
background of the aviation industry; discuss how bilateral agreements for air 
transport came about and the industry’s move toward open skies agreements; 
discuss the United States’ open skies history; explain the U.S.–EU Open 
Skies Agreement, its two phases, and the role of the Joint Committee; 
discuss the U.S. foreign ownership and control rules for air carriers and the 
impediments to an open aviation area; review the current status of the foreign 
ownership and control issue; and review some of the industry’s 
commentators’ solutions for obstacles to deeper liberalization, including a 
discussion of labor and security issues. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Despite the relatively rapid commercial and technological development of 
aviation, most officials, scholars, and practitioners will acknowledge that the 
governance of international air commerce remains stuck in the past, 
operating under rules established in the aftermath of World War II when 
trans-oceanic flight became commercially viable.  This paradox has led to 
much frustration over the past two decades and has often stymied air service 
liberalization.  This frustration is perhaps best summarized in a 2006 study of 
the economic impact of air service liberalization: 
Despite today’s trend toward global markets, free trade, the 
Internet, and the economic integration of entire continents, one 
of the most globalized, technology-intensive industries remains 
encumbered by rules that stifle competition and prevent airlines, 
communities, passengers, and shippers from benefiting to the 
fullest.  The “bilateral air service agreements” (ASAs) that 
continue to govern much of world trade in aviation define the 
terms under which airlines will link their two home territories.  
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These ASAs often frustrate market growth, force users to pay a 
price premium, and create a series of vested interests.4 
In the early years of aviation’s history under government regulation, 
many in the aviation industry believed that federal regulation was necessary 
for the safety of air transportation and to develop and maintain economic 
standards (i.e., fair competition).  After World War II, commercial air travel 
rapidly increased and, accordingly, the U.S. and European governments 
organized regulatory agencies to manage and oversee a growing aviation 
industry.  On the U.S. side of the Atlantic, there was a more developed 
commercial air carrier industry while European air carriers tended to be 
government-owned and focused.  Also, at the time, the United States took the 
fairly unique position that the nascent civil air transportation system was a 
matter of public interest.  Even though the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), predecessor to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was 
primarily concerned with economic regulation during this era, “there was 
equal official concern that the system provide safe, affordable and broadly 
available services to the American public.”5 
In 1944, the United States and its European allies began planning for 
post-war civil aviation.  International regulation of air transport began with 
the establishment of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation.6  
That convention, known as the Chicago Convention, established a 
specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), to promote the orderly growth and development of 
international air transport.  The Chicago Convention established a 
multilateral framework for creating global procedural, technical, and safety 
standards.  However, with many nations struggling to rebuild their post-
Depression and post-war economies, language subject to broad interpretation 
and protectionist elements were incorporated into the Chicago Convention.  
                                                                                                                   
 4 INTERVISTAS-GA2 CONSULTING, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE 
LIBERALIZATION ES-3 (2006) [hereinafter INTERVISTAS-GA2], available at http://www.intervist 
as.com/downloads/reports/20060607_EconomicImpactOfAirServiceLiberalization_FinalReport.
pdf. 
 5 BOOZ ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AN OPEN AVIATION AREA BETWEEN THE EU AND 
THE US 8 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_ 
index/doc/final_report_us_bah.pdf. 
 6 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
[hereinafter Chicago Convention], available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/730 
0_orig.pdf. 
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For example, while the United States argued for liberal aviation rights 
(which ultimately were not agreed to by other states), U.S. negotiators 
continued to insist on strict ownership and control laws for U.S. air carriers.  
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 required that all aircraft registered in the 
United States be owned and controlled by a citizen of the United States.7  In 
1938, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act that further restricted 
foreign ownership of U.S. air carriers.8  Since this time U.S. ownership and 
control restrictions evolved little and continue to be a source of friction 
between the United States and EU.  While the United States has aggressively 
pursued Open Skies agreements worldwide, a major focus of this Article will 
be the debate over foreign ownership and control of air carriers as a 
remaining major roadblock toward a trans-Atlantic Open Aviation Area. 
A.  The 1944 Chicago Convention and Emergence of Bilateral Agreements 
Overall, the Chicago Convention contemplated that governments would 
exchange scheduled international air transport rights through ASAs.  In other 
words, the Chicago Convention held that no scheduled international air 
service may be operated over or into the territory of another contracting state 
without their express permission.9  Based on this legal framework, 
government-to-government ASAs proliferated, regulating everything from 
routes and frequencies to fares and ownership.  These agreements most often 
required the two governments to agree on terms such as routes serviced 
between the two countries, approvals for pricing by the air carriers, any fifth 
freedom rights,10 and ownership and control nationality requirements.   
The Bermuda I bilateral, signed by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in 1946, was the historical model for bilateral agreements.11  It 
established a precedent for the signing of approximately 3,000 other ASAs 
worldwide.  Under Bermuda I, delegates from the United States and Great 
Britain—at the time the two largest carriers of civilian air traffic—attempted 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568. 
 8 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973. 
 9 Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.   
 10 Fifth freedom rights allow an air carrier to transport passengers from a country other than 
the air carrier’s home country to a third country on routes originating or ending in the home 
country.  For a brief description of what are generally described as aviation “freedom rights” 
see Freedom Rights, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR AVIATION AND INT’L AFFAIRS,  
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Data/freedoms.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 11 Air Services Agreement, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499. 
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to resolve issues remaining from the 1944 Chicago meeting where the parties 
only agreed upon the first two “freedoms” of civil air transport.12  Under 
Bermuda I, the parties agreed to accept the third, fourth, and fifth freedom 
rights, which had not been agreed to by the parties to the Chicago 
Convention.13   
The agreement specified the routes between the United States and Great 
Britain that the carriers of both countries and fifth freedom rights could 
serve.  Carriers were free to set capacities and determine flight frequencies 
within the limits of the agreement.  Finally, carrier prices were set through 
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), subject to the approval 
of both governments. 
Great Britain unilaterally terminated the Berlin I agreement in 1976, 
replacing it with the Bermuda II agreement in 1977, which had more 
restrictive provisions.14  Instead of allowing airlines to determine capacities 
and flight frequencies on permitted routes, the Bermuda II agreement 
returned to a much less liberal arrangement where the two governments 
determined capacities for the carriers.  It also restricted the number of airport 
gateways in the United States to be served directly from London Heathrow 
airport.  At the same time, it permitted non-scheduled airlines to operate 
between the two countries, using other airports, particularly the relatively 
new airport at Gatwick.15  Finally, fifth freedom rights were substantially 
more restricted under Bermuda II. 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387, available at http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/chicago1944b.pdf.  First 
freedom is the right to fly over the territory of another country.  Second freedom is the right to 
land for essential repairs, refueling, or to escape adverse weather conditions in another 
country.  These rights, along with fifth freedom rights, are often referred to as “transit” rights.  
Freedoms of the Air, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/trivia/freedom 
s_air.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 13 Third freedom right allows an air carrier to transport passengers and cargo from the 
airline’s home country to discharge them at another country.  Fourth freedom right allows an 
air carrier to transport passengers from another country to the airline’s home country.  These 
rights are often referred to as “traffic” rights, and are typically simultaneously granted.  
Freedoms of the Air, supra note 12. 
 14 Agreement Concerning Air Services, U.S.-U.K., July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367. 
 15 Id. 
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B.  The Movement Toward “Open Skies” Agreements 
With deregulation of the airline industry in the United States in 1978,16 
the U.S. government and U.S. air carriers entered into a period of often-
uneasy efforts to liberalize access to international markets by way of ASAs.  
While the Belgium,17 Netherlands,18 and Germany19 protocols were quickly 
adopted in 1978, removing many restrictions with these two European 
partners, further negotiating efforts were limited.  These early post-
deregulation bilateral agreements differed from the Bermuda I and Bermuda 
II agreements in several significant areas: 
First, they undermined the price-fixing authority of IATA by 
allowing individual carriers to set prices with minimal 
government oversight.  Second, they specified a much wider 
system of routes permitted between the two signatory countries, 
typically allowing any possible third or fourth freedom route.  
Third, they permitted carriers to fly extensive fifth freedom 
routes, subject to third country approval (i.e., fifth freedom 
routes begin or end in a third country and this third country’s 
approval is required for the route to be operated).20 
These early bilateral agreements are viewed as the precursor to the Open 
Skies agreements that the United States began to negotiate in the 1990s.21  
Air transportation plays a vital role in supporting and growing the economies 
of nations, and never more so than in the last decade of the twentieth century 
where technological advancements extended the range of aircraft, and air 
travel became more readily available worldwide.  Aviation helped lead the 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as 
amended in scattered section of 18, 26, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 17 Protocol Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of Belgium Relating to Air Transport, U.S.-Belg., Dec. 12–14, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 617. 
 18 Protocol Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport Agreement of 1957, 
U.S.-Neth., Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088. 
 19 Protocol Relating to the United States of America—Federal Republic of Germany Air 
Transport Agreement of 1955, U.S.-Ger., Nov. 1, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 7323. 
 20 Christian Hofer & Martin Dresner, The United States-European Union Open Aviation 
Area: The American Perspective, 46 J. TRANSP. RES. F., 129, 130 (2007), available at http://jo 
urnals.oregondigital.org/trforum/article/download/1001/896. 
 21 Dep’t of Transp., Defining “Open Skies,” DOT Order 92-8-13, Docket No. 48130 (Aug. 
5, 1992). 
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way to the “globalization” of world trade, travel, and economic development, 
and the globalized world economy now depends to a large degree on an 
increasingly efficient and available international air transportation system.  
The United States’ Open Skies policy has gone hand in hand with airline and 
air transportation globalization. 
Open Skies agreements establish liberal rules and regulations for 
international aviation markets and focus government intervention on areas 
that require regulations, such as safety, security, environment, and consumer 
protection.  Typically, provisions in these agreements apply to passenger and 
cargo transportation and cover both scheduled and charter air services.  Key 
provisions in an Open Skies agreement include: 
(1) Free Market Competition—No restrictions on 
international route rights; number of designated airlines; 
capacity; frequencies; or types of aircraft. 
(2) Pricing Determined by Market Forces—A fare can be 
disallowed only if both governments concur (“double-
disapproval pricing”) and only for certain, specified 
reasons intended to ensure competition. 
(3) Doing Business Protections—For example: 
  ● All carriers of both countries may establish sales 
offices in the other country, and convert earnings and 
remit them promptly and without restrictions. 
  ● Carriers are free to provide their own ground-handling 
services (“self-handling”) or choose among competing 
providers.  Airlines and cargo consolidators may 
arrange ground transport of air cargo and are 
guaranteed access to customs services. 
  ● User charges are non-discriminatory and based on 
costs. 
(4) Cooperative Marketing Arrangements—Airlines may 
enter into code-sharing or leasing arrangements with 
airlines of either country, or with those of third countries.  
An optional provision authorizes code-sharing between 
airlines and surface transportation companies. 
(5) Provisions for Consultation and Arbitration—Model text 
includes procedures for resolving differences that arise 
under the agreement. 
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(6) Liberal Charter Arrangements—Carriers may choose to 
operate under the charter regulations of either country. 
(7) Safety and Security—Each government agrees to observe 
high standards of aviation safety and security, and to 
render assistance to the other in certain circumstances. 
(8) Optional 7th Freedom All-Cargo Rights—Provides 
authority for an airline of one country to operate all-cargo 
services between the other country and a third country, via 
flights that are not linked to its homeland.22 
In order to advance its international aviation policy, the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT or Department) announced in 1995 that it would 
seek liberalized aviation agreements with European countries and other 
partners to provide for open entry on all air routes, unrestricted capacity and 
frequency on all such routes, open rights to introduce air service between any 
point in the United States and any point in the partner country, the rights of 
airlines to price their products and services without government restrictions, 
code-sharing arrangements, as well as liberal cargo and charter rights.23 
The United States currently has Open Skies agreements with over 100 
countries.24 
It is the policy of the United States that fully open airline 
markets will provide the most competitive and price-sensitive 
service for consumers.  As a result, it is the Department’s 
policy in international negotiations to seek agreements that do 
not limit the number of carriers that may serve, the capacity 
that they offer, or the prices that they charge.25 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Open Skies Agreement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.st 
ate.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm. 
 23 Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 21.841-
01 (May 3, 1995). 
 24 Open Skies Partners, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ 
rls/othr/ata/114805.htm.   
 25 International Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/intlaffairs. 
htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); see also Hofer & Dresner, supra note 20 (“As a result of the 
open skies agreements, United States airlines enjoy largely unrestricted access to most 
transatlantic aviation markets.”). 
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C.  Development of U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreements 
Included among existing Open Skies agreements negotiated in the 1990s 
were sixteen agreements between the United States and individual European 
governments, thus distinguishing the importance of an open transatlantic 
aviation market.26  Clearly, the United States’ relationship with our European 
allies has historically been significant.  Over the years it has evolved into a 
close commercial and political relationship, and the United States and EU 
have become each other’s largest trade and investment partners.27  Aviation 
is key to the success of these transatlantic relationships.   
Since the easing of the restrictive Bermuda II agreement in 1995, with the 
opening of routes between the U.S. and U.K. regional airports, air carriers 
from both the United States and Great Britain have seen an expansion of air 
services and traffic; consequently, the economic benefits have been 
significant.28  Furthermore, the 1992 EU Regulation that in essence finalized 
the Single European Aviation market,29 significantly increased intra-
European air traffic and encouraged investment in new services and low-cost 
air carriers.30  The U.S. and EU air transport markets represent the two 
largest air transport markets in the world.  The U.S. air transport market is 
the largest in the world, with the EU representing the second largest market.  
                                                                                                                   
 26 See Air Transport Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ 
ata/index.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (listing individual agreements).  As of 2007 and the 
signing of the 2007 Agreement, ten member states still had no Open Skies agreements with 
the United States.  These ten member states were:  Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.   
 27 European Union, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/coun 
tries-regions/Europe-middle-east/Europe/European-union (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 28 See  INTERVISTAS-GA2, supra note 4, at 14 (noting a “strong causal relationship between 
liberalization, air service improvement, and international traffic”). 
 29 Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) (EC) (noting that aviation liberalization and 
the creation of one market occurred over a period of years and that “Council Decision 
87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled air services between Member States(4) 
and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for scheduled air services(5) 
constitute the first steps towards achieving the internal market in respect of air fares”).  While 
these documents directly led to the creation of the Single Aviation Market, preceding them is the 
Single European Act which committed Member states to the establishment of a single internal 
market comprising “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital is ensured” by December 31, 1992.  Id.  
 30 See  INTERVISTAS-GA2, supra note 4, at 15–16 (noting the regional impact and value 
added). 
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In 2010, the U.S. market carried over 787 million passengers,31 and the EU 
market carried over 796 million passengers,32 and, the traffic between the 
two markets is around 57 million passengers and forecast to continue to 
grow.33  Furthermore, IATA forecasts that the North America market will 
make up 25% of all scheduled air services and the EU market 24% in 2011.34   
In addition to passenger services, the U.S.–EU aviation market 
encompasses the most advanced air cargo network in the world.  Combined, 
the U.S. and EU freight fleets account for more than 71% of the world 
total.35  The commodities traded via the U.S.–EU aviation market reveal a 
diverse trade of pharmaceuticals, technical equipment, aerospace products, 
semiconductors, and computer equipment.36  In addition, code sharing37 
partnerships and airline alliances38 between U.S. and EU air carriers have 
further strengthened this transatlantic aviation relationship. 
Despite the positive effects of this piecemeal approach (i.e., individual 
bilateral agreements) with EU countries, liberalization efforts were hindered 
in December 1998 when the European Commission (EC or Commission) 
sued some of these countries before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
claiming that their Open Skies agreements improperly infringed on the 
European Community’s (Community) jurisdiction.  In particular, the 
Commission contended, and the ECJ agreed, that the bilateral treaties violate 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Passengers: All Carriers – All Airports, RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., 
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 32 Air Transport of Passengers, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do? 
tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=ttr00012&plugin=1 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011). 
 33 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST FISCAL YEARS 2009–2025, at 71 
(2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2009-2025/ 
media/Forecast%20Tables.pdf. 
 34 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, IATA ECONOMIC BRIEFING: PASSENGER AND FREIGHT 
FORECASTS 2007 TO 2011, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/ 
economics/traffic_forecast_2007_2011.pdf.   
 35 BOOZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 41. 
 36 Id. at 43. 
 37 “Code sharing” is a term for the practice of multiple airlines selling space on the same 
flights, where a seat can be purchased on one airline but may actually be operated by a 
cooperating airline under a different flight number or airline code.  14 C.F.R. § 257.3 (2011). 
 38 An “airline alliance” is an agreement between two or more airlines to cooperate on a 
substantial level where typically cost savings are realized by the air carriers, and air travelers 
benefit from lower costs and more choices.  See Dep’t of Transp., Joint Application of 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, DOT Order 93-1-11, Docket 48342 
(Jan. 11, 1993) (example of airline alliance); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308, 41309. 
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EC transport regulations.39  The EC transport regulations created a complete 
set of Community rules for the internal air transportation market, including 
regulations on licensing of air carriers,40 access to intra-Community air 
routes,41 and fares and rates for air services.42  The ECJ found that nationality 
clauses, which created exclusive market rights for treaty member countries, 
led to illegal discrimination by precluding airlines from other EU nations to 
enter the transatlantic market.43 
As a result of this decision, the European Council issued a mandate to the 
Commission to negotiate an agreement with the United States which covered 
all of the EU members (often referred to by the EU as an “Open Aviation 
Area”), and in October 2003, the United States and the EU opened what 
would eventually be successful but lengthy and often contentious 
negotiations to liberalize the transatlantic aviation market.   
III.  U.S.–EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT 
Upon opening negotiations, John Byerly, the lead negotiator for the 
United States and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation for the 
Department of State, stated that “a U.S.–EU agreement has the potential to 
alter fundamentally the framework for transatlantic and global aviation and 
provide the benefits of a market-oriented approach.”44  When negotiations 
briefly broke down in 2004, the lead EU negotiator and Director of Air 
Transport Directorate for the European Commission, Daniel Calleja, agreed 
that any agreement would have global significance.  He added: 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Taken together, the following cases are considered the “Open Skies Judgment”: Case C-
466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. 
Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-09519; Case C-468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-09575; 
Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I-09627; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v. 
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-09681; Case C-472/98, Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I-
09741; Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-09797; Case C-476/98, Comm’n v. 
Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-09855.   
 40 Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1. 
 41 Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8. 
 42 Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15. 
 43 See, e.g., Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 
E.C.R. I-09519; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRANSATLANTIC AVIATION: 
EFFECTS OF EASING RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.–EUROPEAN MARKETS (2004), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04835.pdf. 
 44 US & EU Hold Talks on Transatlantic Air Services Agreement, AMCHAM NOR. (Oct. 7, 
2010), http://www.amcham.no/us--eu-hold-talks-on-transatlantic-air-services-agreement/678.  
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Our negotiations are being followed with keen interest by other 
nations around the world because whatever we agree has the 
potential to set the benchmark for the future regulation of the 
international air transport industry.  That is quite a 
responsibility.  And that is why we must consider not only the 
level of, and conditions for, market opening that we wish to 
achieve between us, but also the level of market opening that 
we aim for worldwide.45 
Unfortunately, it would take over four years to reach any agreement.  The 
desire of European carriers to have ownership and control rights in the 
United States, and the U.S. government’s inability to grant that access, 
delayed and nearly derailed a final accord.  Furthermore, the issue of foreign 
ownership and control of air carriers remained an unresolved and sensitive 
issue.  The agreement was finally reached in 2007. 
A.  First Stage Open Skies Agreement46 
As approved on April 30, 2007, the 2007 Agreement replaced all existing 
bilateral agreements between the United States and EU Members.47  The new 
agreement recognized one large European market and provided for every 
U.S. and every EU air carrier to: 
●  Fly between every city in the European Union and every 
city in the United States;48  
●  Operate without restrictions on flights, routes, and 
aircraft;49 
●  Set prices based on the market and without government 
interference;50 and  
                                                                                                                   
 45 Daniel Calleja, Dir., Air Transp. European Comm’n, Address at the International 
Aviation Club (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2004/0 
41116dc.htm. 
 46 In 2007, the author prepared a Note on this historic development for the American 
Society of International Law: Charles A. Hunnicutt, Introductory Note on US–EU Open Skies 
Agreement, 46 I.L.M. 467 (2007). 
 47 While approved in 2007, the agreement has only been applied since March 30, 2008.  
2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 25. 
 48 Id. art. 3, para. 1(a). 
 49 Id. para. 1(b).  
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●  Enter into cooperative agreements between airlines, 
regardless of country of operation.51 
The new provisions were expected to have several key effects on the 
trans-Atlantic aviation environment.  By doing away with traditional bilateral 
agreements, for the first time every European airline would be able to fly 
from any city in Europe to any city in the United States—irrespective of that 
airline’s country of origin.  These rights have provided consumers with more 
price and service options.52   
The 2007 Agreement has also facilitated needed consolidation in the 
European airline industry by allowing European airlines to merge or acquire 
other airlines without compromising their U.S. routes.  Additionally, the 
2007 Agreement established a Joint Committee to meet at least once per year 
to ensure its implementation, resolve any disputes arising from the 2007 
Agreement, and recommend areas for further development or amendment 
thereto.53  To date, the Joint Committee has met eight times and discussed 
specific or technical issues covered by the 2007 Agreement, including safety, 
security, and legal issues (e.g., discussion of aviation security measures in 
light of the December 25, 2009, attempted passenger bomb, updates of court 
decisions and regulatory rule-makings, and review of reports by working 
groups of the Committee, most notably the Legal Working Group regarding 
the conditions and procedures for “accession” by Iceland and Norway to the 
Agreement).  A more detailed discussion of the Joint Committee is set forth 
in Part IV. 
Finally, the 2007 Agreement opened London Heathrow Airport to all 
airlines; this was potentially the most important and lucrative effect of the 
negotiations.  In doing so, the United States finally achieved an end to the 
restrictive provisions of the Bermuda II Agreement by opening Heathrow 
Airport to all U.S. air carriers from any U.S. city.  In return, the EU 
succeeded in obtaining U.S. recognition of European air carriers as 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Id. art. 13, para. 1. 
 51 Id. art. 10, para. 1. 
 52 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Office of the Sec’y, Notice of United Air Lines, Inc. and 
Aer Lingus Limited of Additional Code-Share Service, Docket 2008-0176 (Feb. 17, 2009).  Aer 
Lingus received approval to offer daily service between Washington Dulles Airport and Madrid, 
Spain, beginning March 28, 2010.  Aer Lingus, United Airlines Code Share Agreement (Jan. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.aerlingus.com/aboutus/investorrelations/pressreleases/2010press 
releases/UA_070109_FINAL.pdf. 
 53 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 52, art. 18. 
678  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 39:663 
 
“Community Airlines” owned by Europeans with the right to fly from any 
European city to any U.S. city. 
Despite these positive effects, this initial agreement did not address some 
important issues for the trans-Atlantic relationship and for aviation 
agreements more broadly.  Although the EU Commission pressed hard for 
greater liberalization of the U.S. domestic market throughout the 
negotiations, the United States was unable to address those concerns.  
Specifically, the United States rejected any attempt to reduce U.S. ownership 
and control laws pertaining to the ownership of U.S. air carriers.   In the 
United States, foreign entities cannot control a U.S. carrier, nor can they own 
more than 25% of voting, or, pursuant to case law, 49% of total, shares in a 
U.S. carrier.  EU restrictions limit foreign entities to owning no more than 
49% of any shares in an EU carrier as long as a European company 
maintains effective control.  This increasingly contentious issue is discussed 
in further detail in Part V. 
Despite the historic significance of the 2007 Agreement, those key issues 
remained unresolved.  Thus, as finalized, it called for the parties to initiate 
further meetings by May 2008 to negotiate a second stage agreement and 
further liberalize the aviation industry.  If a second accord was not reached 
by 2010, the first stage agreement allowed either party to “suspend rights 
specified in [the 2007] Agreement.”54 
1.  Joint Report on Trans-Atlantic Alliance Progress 
On November 16, 2010, the Commission and the DOT issued a joint 
report titled, “Transatlantic Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and 
Regulatory Approaches,”55 which examined the competitive structures of the 
airline industries in Europe and the United States.  The report finds that 
the competitive structures of the airline industries are similar.  
Despite important differences in legal regimes, the report finds 
that there is scope for the Commission and DOT to work 
towards the promotion of compatible regulatory approaches, as 
                                                                                                                   
 54 2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21. 
 55 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND 
REGULATORY APPROACHES (2010), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50Role_fil 
es/JointAllianceReport.pdf. 
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specified in Annex 2 to the [2007] Agreement, to achieve pro-
competitive outcomes for consumers and the airline industry.56 
Among its conclusions, the report found that the 2007 Agreement has 
increased competition in the transatlantic market: 
The most immediate effect of the EU–U.S. Air Transport 
Agreement was to introduce more competition in transatlantic 
markets.  The provisional implementation of the Agreement as 
of end of March 2008 led to capacity and structural changes.  
While overall capacity has decreased in the U.S.–EU market 
since 2007 likely due to economic conditions, there has been a 
diversification of services.  On the U.S.–London Heathrow 
routes, departures are up 15.3% versus 2007 and overall seats 
have increased by 8.7%.  Given the economy, new services on 
the U.S.-London Heathrow routes account for much of the 
changed landscape.  Carriers now provide more frequencies 
and serve more destinations in the United States from London 
Heathrow.57 
The report also cites progress under the European nationality clause in the 
Agreement, which allows all EU airlines the right to operate from any point 
in the EU (i.e., even outside their home country) to the United States.  It 
notes that both British Airways and, briefly, Air France, have operated routes 
to the United States from outside their home territories.58 
The report acknowledges that the formalization of cooperation on 
competition matters between the EU and the U.S. on aviation matters is 
another significant result of the 2007 Agreement:   
Annex 2 to the Agreement allows for general exchange of 
views and experience between the two authorities and aims at 
inter alia reducing the potential conflicts in the application of 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Press Release, European Comm’n, Competition: European Commission and U.S. 
Department of Transportation Publish Report on Transatlantic Alliances (Nov. 16, 2010), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1511&format=PDF 
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 57 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 55, at 12 (footnote omitted). 
 58 Id. 
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the competition regimes in the EU and U.S. and promoting 
compatible regulatory approaches through a better 
understanding of the methodologies, analytical techniques and 
remedies used in the respective competition reviews of the 
Commission and DOT.59 
The report concludes that cooperation on competitive matters is 
“fruitful.”60 
Given the significance of changes and new opportunities under the 2007 
Agreement, its full effects still cannot be evaluated and it will likely take 
several more years for the market to fully adjust.  With the positive progress 
cataloged in this report, the parties moved forward with the second stage 
negotiations for further liberalization of the market. 
B.  Second Stage Open Skies Agreement 
Almost immediately after the United States and the European Union signed 
the 2007 Open Skies Agreement, negotiations began on further “second stage” 
liberalization efforts.61  On March 25, 2010, after eight rounds of negotiation, 
negotiators reached a second stage Agreement (2010 Agreement).  The most 
immediate effect of this Agreement is that the parties agreed to make 
permanent the 2007 Agreement.  Prior to this concession, Great Britain 
insisted on inserting a clause in the 2007 Agreement that would allow either 
party to suspend the terms of the Agreement unless certain issues (i.e., U.S. 
restrictions on foreign ownership) were addressed in the second stage 
negotiations.62  This “suspension clause” was removed from the 2010 
Agreement; thus the rights agreed to in 2007 have become established.63 
As approved, the 2010 Agreement provides for further liberalization and 
cooperation in aviation security, safety, competition, and ease of travel.  This 
agreement improves regulatory cooperation in the following areas: 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Second stage negotiations began in May 2008, less than sixty days after the first stage 
agreement came into effect. This timetable was foreseen in the first stage agreement, which 
established a detailed framework for the second stage negotiations, including a list of priority 
topics for discussion.  2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21. 
 62 Id. 
 63 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 6 (replacing Article 21 of the 2007 
Agreement).   
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●  Environmental—Cooperation to address the local and 
global environmental challenges by fostering 
compatibility, consistency and avoiding duplication 
between their respective emission trading schemes.  In 
addition, the parties have stated their commitment to 
cooperation on green technologies, fuels, and air traffic 
management innovation and to joint efforts in ICAO to 
address the climate change impact of international air 
services.64 
●  Security—Further cooperation on aviation security via the 
Joint Committee with a goal of achieving maximum 
reliance on each party’s security measures and avoiding 
duplication.  The cooperation will include coordinated 
responses to new threats and consultations prior to 
introducing additional measures, as well as a “reciprocal 
recognition of regulatory decisions.”65  
●  Fitness and Citizenship—Under the 2010 Agreement, 
there will be reciprocal recognition of regulatory 
determinations with regards to air carrier fitness and 
citizenship.  Thus, U.S. authorities will rely on EU 
Member states’ regulatory decisions that an EU air carrier 
is financially fit and European-owned when dealing with 
applications from EU air carriers.66 
●  U.S. Government Transportation—Under the 2010 
Agreement, EU air carriers will have the right previously 
restricted under the “Fly America” program, to sell tickets 
to contractors of the U.S. government and partial ability to 
transport U.S. government officials.67 
One historic breakthrough is an article in which both parties agree to be 
guided in the implementation of the full agreement in a manner that does not 
undermine labor rights.  This is the first time that an air transport agreement 
includes an explicit commitment to high labor standards.68  “The Parties 
                                                                                                                   
 64 Id. art. 3 (replacing Article 15 of the 2007 Agreement). 
 65 Id. art. 5. 
 66 Id. art. 2 (inserting a new Article 6 bis into the 2007 Agreement). 
 67 Id. art. 7. 
 68 Id. art. 4. 
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recognise the importance of the social dimension of the Agreement and the 
benefits that arise when open markets are accompanied by high labour 
standards” and that any opportunities provided by the Agreement should not 
undermine labor standards, rights, or principles under each party’s laws.69 
Finally, the 2010 Agreement further extends the role of the U.S.–EU Joint 
Committee to include matters of aviation safety, air traffic management, 
passenger facilitation, and the mutual recognition of regulatory decisions.70  
The Joint Committee is also tasked with considering, as appropriate, “the 
conditions and procedures, including any necessary amendments to this 
Agreement, that would be required for additional third countries to accede to 
this Agreement.”71 
The most controversial aspects of the 2010 Agreement are, arguably, the 
two issues that are the subject of legislative review and change.  First, the 
issue of lessening restrictions in the United States on foreign ownership and 
control of U.S. air carriers remains unresolved.  Upon legislative change in 
the United States, the EU will reciprocally allow majority ownership of EU 
air carriers by U.S. nationals.72  Second, the right for EU air carriers to fly 
between the United States and a number of non-European countries (i.e., 
seventh freedom rights), as well as the removal of obstacles for European 
majority investment in third country-airlines by facilitating access to the U.S. 
market, have not been resolved.  The United States will grant these rights 
once changes occur in the EU that provide a balanced approach, enforceable 
at the EU level for noise operating restrictions at airports.73  Both sides have 
committed to continuing to work on these issues,74 but have also 
acknowledged that there was no “timetable” or “deadlines” for resolving 
these outstanding matters.75   
                                                                                                                   
 69 Id. (amending Article 17 of the 2007 Agreement). 
 70 Id. art. 5 (amending or replacing certain paragraphs of Article 18 of the 2007 Agreement). 
 71 Id.  Notably, the Joint Committee is already reviewing the process and procedures for 
accession by Iceland and Norway.  Eventually, the Committee will likely have to address the 
issue of accession to the Agreement of Canada and Mexico, partners to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement with the United States.  There have been other movements toward 
establishing and maintaining common aviation markets.  See, e.g., Single Aviation Market 
Arrangements, Austl.-N.Z., Sept. 19, 1996, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/sam.pdf. 
 72 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 6. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. art. 5. 
 75 James Kanter & Nicola Clark, U.S. and E.U. Agree to Expand Open Skies Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at B3. 
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While the 2010 Agreement is another positive development in the 
important trans-Atlantic aviation relationship between the United States and 
the European Union, the issues of foreign ownership and airport noise and 
other operating restrictions are perhaps the most difficult issues preventing a 
full and open aviation market.76  These issues will not be readily or easily 
resolved.  From the EU perspective, continuing restrictions on foreign 
ownership of U.S. air carriers is viewed as an outdated regulatory constraint 
that is preventing a full opening of the market.  From the U.S. perspective, 
the EU must obtain jurisdiction over and establish a balanced approach 
methodology for airport noise regulations and lift certain night restrictions.  
At the conclusion of the Agreement negotiations, lead negotiators for both 
the United States and the European Union acknowledged that they kept 
butting up against existing laws that limited how much could be achieved on 
these issues.77  However, success in these areas depends on both sides of the 
Atlantic addressing these issues.  Even with the already visible positive 
results of the 2010 Agreement, such advancements do not appear to be 
sufficient for either the EU Parliament or the U.S. Congress to further 
advance trans-Atlantic air transport liberalization at this time.  What must 
occur first is the building of a broader consensus among the policymakers. 
The members of the EU Parliament are already asking the EU 
Commission to begin a third stage of negotiations with the hopes of a further 
liberalizing agreement no later than December 31, 2013.78  While laudable, 
the remaining issues to negotiate may prove more difficult to resolve, and 
unfortunately require more time to change longstanding opposition of 
legislators in both the United States and the European Union.  Before we turn 
to the issue of U.S. foreign ownership and control, we will focus on the 
U.S.–EU Joint Committee that may lay the ground work for the cooperation 
needed to solve these larger issues.  This Committee, formed under the 2007 
Agreement, was given further authority under the 2010 Agreement,79 and is 
responsible for resolving questions related to the interpretation or application 
of the 2007 Agreement, reviewing the implementation of the 2007 
                                                                                                                   
 76 It should be noted that cabotage restriction is another area of disagreement, but is omitted 
from discussion in this Article.  
 77 See 2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21. 
 78 European Parliament Calls for EU–US Open Skies Progress, CAPA CTR. FOR AVIATION 
(June 18, 2010), http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/european-parliament-calls-for-eu-us-
open-skies-progress-53193.  
 79 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5. 
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Agreement, and facilitating greater co-operation between the parties.  Its 
charter and its functioning to date deserve greater attention. 
IV.  U.S.–EU JOINT COMMITTEE 
The Joint Committee, which was created by the 2007 Agreement,80 is 
unique in the sense that none of the Open Skies bilateral agreements signed 
by the United States to date provide for the creation of such a committee.81  
Not even the other multilateral open skies accord signed by the United 
States, the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of 
International Air Transportation (MALIAT) with New Zealand, Singapore, 
Brunei, and Chile, later joined by Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, and 
Mongolia,82 provides for such a committee.83  However, given the 
complexities of dealing with multiple partners, i.e., the European Community 
and its twenty-seven Member States, the EU requested that the Committee be 
instituted to improve communication, discussions, and decisions between the 
United States on one side, and the EU members on the other side.  The 2010 
Agreement further extends the role of the Committee, and the industry has 
viewed the 2010 Agreement as a positive step toward achieving the goals of 
the 2007 Agreement. 
The Committee is a body consisting of representatives of the signatory 
parties that monitors the implementation of the 2007 Agreement and 
coordinates the various work streams of regulatory cooperation.84  It is 
chaired jointly by a representative of the European Community and its 
Member States and by a representative of the United States.85  The U.S. 
delegation consists of multi-agency representation, chaired by the 
Department of State.86  The EU delegation consists of the European 
Community and its Member States.87 
                                                                                                                   
 80 2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18.  
 81 See Air Transport Agreements, supra note 26 (containing links to the texts of the Open 
Skies Agreements and Air Transport Agreements signed by the United States). 
 82 MALIAT, http://www.maliat.govt.nz/country/matrix.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).  
Peru joined in 2002 but withdrew in 2005.  Id.   
 83 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation, May 1, 
2001, 2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 69 [hereinafter MALIAT].  
 84 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Memorandum of Consultations, U.S.–EU (Mar. 2, 2007), para. 37, available at http:// 
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Since its inception, the Committee has met at least once a year, and has 
developed methodologies to address specific or technical issues covered by 
the 2007 Agreement, including, safety, security, and legal issues.  The 
Committee’s new extended roles implemented by the 2010 Agreement will 
increase compatibility of regulatory regimes between the United States and 
the Member States of the European Union.  These roles will streamline the 
work of the Committee and further improve exchange of information, 
discussions, and resolutions among the multiple parties, and, accordingly, 
deepen air service freedoms. 
The 2010 Agreement created four important new roles for the Committee 
and clarified one important regulatory responsibility, in addition to the roles 
created by the 2007 Agreement.88  First, the Committee is now in charge of 
“fostering cooperation between the respective authorities of the Parties in 
efforts to develop their respective air traffic management systems with a 
view toward optimising the interoperability and compatibility of those 
systems, reducing costs, and enhancing their safety, capacity, and 
environmental performance.”89  Second, the Committee will promote the 
“development of proposals for joint projects and initiatives in the field of 
aviation safety, including with third countries.”90  Third, it will be the 
Committee’s responsibility to encourage “continued close cooperation 
among the relevant aviation security authorities of the Parties, including 
initiatives to develop security procedures that enhance passenger and cargo 
facilitation without compromising security.”91  Fourth, the Committee will 
consider “whether the Parties’ respective laws, regulations, and practices in 
areas covered by Annex 9 of the [1944 Chicago] Convention (Facilitation) 
may affect the exercise of rights under this [2007] Agreement.”92  
Additionally, the Committee is now tasked with “developing, where 
requested by the Parties, arrangements for the reciprocal recognition of 
regulatory determinations.”93 
                                                                                                                   
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114892.pdf. 
 88 See 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5 (replacing art. 18 of the 2007 
Agreement). 
 89 Id. art. 5, para. 4(f). 
 90 Id. para. 4(g). 
 91 Id. para. 4(h). 
 92 Id. para. 4(i). 
 93 Id. para. 4(e) (amending art. 18, para. 4(e) of the 2007 Agreement). 
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Further, the Committee will continue to review the overall 
implementation of the 2007 Agreement, including any effects of aviation 
infrastructure constraints on the exercise of traffic rights, the effects of 
security measures taken pursuant to the terms of Article 9 of the 2007 
Agreement, the effects on the conditions of competition, including in the 
field of global distribution systems, and any social effects (i.e., labor 
standards and rights) of the implementation of the 2007 Agreement.  As an 
additional and important feature the 2010 Agreement introduced, which will 
reduce the red tape regarding the implementation of the 2007 Agreement, the 
Committee will now consider “individual issues or proposals that either 
Party identifies as affecting, or having the potential to affect, operations 
under the [2007] Agreement, such as conflicting regulatory requirements.”94 
The creation of the Committee has allowed a seamless exchange of 
information among the parties and has functioned successfully to implement 
the goals of the 2007 Agreement.  For instance, the parties to the Committee 
have fostered positive security measures that will benefit the U.S. and EU 
aviation markets and the entire industry, which resulted from the continued 
cooperation among the parties involved.95  Also, the Committee serves as a 
forum for each party to discuss its questions and concerns over the other 
party’s local proposals that may adversely affect the 2007 Agreement or the 
aviation industry, to understand the other party’s position regarding specific 
issues, and to cooperate with each other to reach a decision that will strike a 
balance between the terms of the 2007 Agreement and the parties’ laws and 
regulations.96  Areas that the Committee is likely to consider in some manner 
in the future include: aviation security, air cargo, cargo security, explosive 
detection, competition, consumer protection, U.S. regulation of foreign repair 
stations, ground handling, slot regulation, the U.S.–EU Aviation Safety 
Agreement, third-country air carrier assessment, and the impact of FAA 
Reauthorization legislation. 
Since its inception, the Committee has addressed several issues, including 
security and environmental concerns, which tend to delay the aviation 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Id. para. 3 (amending art. 18, para. 3 of the 2007 Agreement). 
 95 See, e.g., U.S.–EU Joint Committee Record of Meeting, Jan. 14, 2010, available at http:// 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/137493.pdf. 
 96 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, para. 23; see also Record of Seventh Meeting of the EU–
U.S. Joint Committee (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizat 
ion/144199.pdf; Record of Eighth Meeting of the EU–U.S. Joint Committee (Nov. 17, 2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/151670.pdf. 
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industry from moving to further market liberalization.  The Committee could 
serve as a model for future multilateral agreements, especially when the 
aviation industry moves from bilateral agreements to a broader market/region 
reach (e.g., Latin America, Asia, etc.).  Of course, the success of future 
committees depends on each party’s willingness to work together to reach 
the goals of air service freedoms while allowing for secure, safe air 
operations that are also as environmentally friendly as possible. 
V.  FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AIR CARRIERS 
In addition to the issues outlined above, the United States and the 
European Union confronted another major issue when negotiating the 2010 
Agreement.  Leading up to the second stage negotiations, the EU called for 
an Open Aviation Area with unlimited rights for U.S. and EU citizens to own 
and control airlines organized in the other’s territory.97  As discussed below, 
airline ownership and control was as difficult for the United States and the 
European Union throughout the second stage negotiations as it had been in 
the first stage. 
A.  Restrictions on Foreign Ownership in the United States 
The United States maintains a longstanding policy that U.S. citizens own 
U.S. air carriers.98  The first citizenship requirements date back to the post-
World War I era, when Congress was concerned that foreign ownership of 
U.S. carriers would threaten national security.  In 1926, Congress passed the 
Air Commerce Act, which set forth aircraft registration requirements and 
stated that the owner of registered aircraft had to be a “citizen of the United 
States.”99  At that time, the term “citizen of the United States” was defined as 
either a U.S. citizen, a U.S. partnership in which all partners were U.S. 
citizens, or a U.S. corporation for which both the president and at least two-
                                                                                                                   
 97 John R. Byerly, Deputy Asst. Sec’y for Transp. Affairs, Dep’t of State, Remarks at the 
ACI-NA International Aviation Issues Seminar: U.S. International Aviation Policy and 
Challenges (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.aci-na.org/static/entransit/iacbyerly1.pdf. 
 98 Josh Cavinato, Note, Turbulence in the Airline Industry: Rethinking America’s Foreign 
Ownership Restrictions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 315 (2008). 
 99 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926). 
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thirds of the board of directors were U.S. citizens and where at least 51% of 
the voting shares were controlled by U.S. citizens.100  
During the Great Depression, Congress strengthened restrictions on 
foreign ownership of U.S. carriers even further by requiring that at least 75% 
of all voting shares be “owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of 
the United States.”101  The purpose behind the stricter ownership requirement 
was to ensure that U.S. airmail contracts would only be awarded to U.S. 
citizens and to prevent hostile foreign citizens or their governments from 
owning U.S. carriers.102 
These restrictions were retained in 1958 when Congress adopted the 
Federal Aviation Act.103  During this period, Congress was concerned with 
developing the domestic air transportation system.  Moreover, since the 
United States was in the middle of the Cold War, the U.S. Government was 
interested in developing a system that was designed to protect the country 
and defend national security.104 
More recently, in 2003, Congress amended the ownership requirement 
again.105  This latest amendment reflected the longstanding practice of granting 
certificates only to those air carriers owned and controlled by U.S. citizens.106   
Currently, in order to provide air transportation under the U.S. flag, a carrier 
must hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the 
DOT.107  The Department will only grant such certificates to citizens of the 
United States.108  The term “citizen of the United States” is defined as: 
 (A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States; 
 (B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual 
who is a citizen of the United States; or 
 (C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of 
the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. § 9(a). 
 101 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 13, 52 Stat. 973, 978 (1938). 
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L. 379, 382 (2010). 
 103 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101, 72 Stat. 731, 737–38 (1958). 
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 106 Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-76, § 807, 117 
Stat. 2490, 2588 (2003). 
 107 49 U.S.C. § 41.101(a)(1). 
 108 Id. § 41.102(a). 
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territory or possession of the United States, of which the 
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and 
other managing officers are citizens of the United States, which 
is under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and 
in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or 
controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States.109  
Consequently, if a corporation seeks a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate as a U.S. air carrier, it must be formed and organized 
in one of the States, or a U.S. possession or territory, its president, and no 
less than two thirds of the members sitting on the board of directors, as well 
as its managing officers, must be U.S. citizens, the corporation must be under 
the control of U.S. citizens, and no less than 75% of its voting interest must 
be owned or controlled by U.S. citizens.  Each of these criteria must be met 
at all times in order to maintain eligibility to hold a certificate and operate as 
a U.S. carrier.  
In regard to the “actual control” aspect of the restriction, the DOT applied 
a test pursuant to which meeting only the requisite ownership percentages 
was not sufficient for an airline to qualify as a U.S. citizen.110  For example, 
in a couple of earlier cases, the DOT’s predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB), found that (1) an applicant did not qualify as a U.S. carrier 
where the applicant only met the bare minimum ownership requirements and 
did not fulfill its burden of establishing that its governance was in 
accordance with the actual control policy;111 (2) an applicant was under 
foreign control where the applicant’s founder used a $2.5 million loan from 
his Saudi Arabian employer to fund the carrier;112 and (3) an applicant’s 
foreign, nonvoting stockholders could influence the applicant’s crucial 
decisions because they had the power to block any of the voting 
stockholders’ proposals by choosing to dissolve the company.113  In other 
words, “if persons other than U.S. citizens, individually or collectively, can 
                                                                                                                   
 109 Id. § 40.102(a)(15). 
 110 Bimal Patel, A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability–The History and Future of 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States Aviation Industry, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 
487, 490 (2008). 
 111 Willye Peter Daetwyler, 58 C.A.B. 118 (1971). 
 112 Premiere Airlines, 95 C.A.B. 101 (1982). 
 113 Page Avjet, 102 C.A.B. 488, 2–3 (1983); see also Patel, supra note 110, at 490–91 
(explaining that nonvoting stockholders have the right to influence many of the decisions of 
the company as they have the power to dissolve the company and liquidate its assets). 
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significantly influence the affairs of the [applicant], it is not a U.S. 
citizen.”114 
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a shift in the DOT’s focus.  
National security, while still a primary concern, became only part of the 
analysis.  The DOT also became concerned with permitting economic 
partnerships.115  The Northwest/KLM and Continental/Air Canada matters 
illustrate this shift in focus.116  In each matter, a foreign airline sought to 
invest in a U.S. airline.  KLM was ultimately permitted to hold a 49% equity 
stake in Northwest, provided it was non-voting, and KLM could maintain 
three members on Northwest’s board since the other twelve members would 
offset any potential adverse effects.117  Acceptance of this arrangement 
helped pave the way for the United States and the Netherlands to enter into 
the first open skies agreement.118  In the Continental matter, the DOT 
approved a financing plan under which Air Canada would invest $235 
million and receive 27.5% equity and 24% of Continental’s voting stock.119  
Further, Air Canada could select six of Continental’s eighteen board 
members.120  Some believe that the arrangement was approved, in part, 
because Air Canada’s partner was a major U.S. investment group.121 
DOT decisions issued in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 
2001, cast some doubt on the more current trend in actual control according 
to some commentators.122  In the DHL/ASTAR matter, the U.S. DOT stated 
that the ability to exercise actual control over an airline implies having “a 
substantial ability to influence the carrier’s activities.”123  In addition, the 
DOT applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test when conducting the actual 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of Intera Artic Services, Inc., DOT Order 87-8-43, Docket 
No. 44723 (Aug. 8, 1987); Patel, supra note 110, at 491. 
 115 Patel, supra note 110, at 492–93; ISABELLE LELIEUR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL 
OWNERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIRLINES 37 (2003). 
 116 Patel, supra note 110, at 492. 
 117 Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of Northwest Airlines, Inc., DOT Order 91-1-41, Docket 
No. 46371 (Jan. 23, 1991); Patel, supra note 110, at 492–93.  In addition, Northwest’s 
Chairman had to be a U.S. citizen and the Department would continue to scrutinize carefully 
the committee composition. 
 118 Patel, supra note 110, at 493. 
 119 Id. at 494. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. (citing LELIEUR, supra note 115, at 38). 
 122 Id. at 494–95. 
 123 Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of DHL Airways, Inc., DOT Order 2004-5-10, Docket 
No. OST-2002-13089 (May 13, 2004); Patel, supra note 110, at 495. 
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control analysis.124  The DOT ultimately held that ASTAR’s dependence on 
DHL’s extensive network for the majority of its business would not give 
DHL substantial influence over ASTAR.125  Some have questioned this 
decision in terms of whether DHL passed the control test because of DHL’s 
and its advisors’ political influence.126  In the Virgin America case, a U.S. 
limited liability company held 75% of the applicant’s voting equity.127  More 
than 49% of the limited liability company’s equity was held by Cayman 
Island entities or foreign limited partnerships, i.e., by Sir Richard Branson 
and the Virgin Group.128  Hedge funds, involving foreign investors, also 
owned a large share of the limited liability company.129  After the DOT 
initially denied the application, Virgin America assured the DOT that the 
foreign investors in the hedge funds would be completely excluded from 
investing in Virgin America.130  The DOT later approved the transaction 
because Virgin America agreed to place the equity held by the Virgin Group 
into an irrevocable voting trust that was subject to strict conditions,131 and it 
walled off foreign investors within the hedge funds.132  Virgin America was 
further constrained to remove Virgin Group’s veto power over material 
contracts and capital expenditures, which the DOT found to have provided a 
degree of influence over the applicant.133  It also agreed to replace Fred Reid 
as CEO within six months of commencing operations, since the DOT 
suspected him of having close ties to the foreign principals within the Virgin 
Group.134  Changes were also made to Virgin America’s bylaws and board of 
directors in order to remove voting powers resting with some non-U.S. 
entities.135 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Patel, supra note 110, at 495. 
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 127 Dep’t of Transp., Application of Virgin America, Inc., DOT Order 2007-5-11, Docket 
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According to some observers, the DHL and Virgin America matters 
indicate that, while slow, the DOT may be pursuing a progressively liberal 
interpretation of the statutory ownership and control requirements.136 
B.  More Liberal Ownership Rights in the European Union 
Given its unique nature as a group of Member States, the EU ownership 
requirements developed quite differently from those in the United States.  
The European Commission adopted an initial air transport memorandum in 
July 1979 that set forth the overall issues facing the European airline industry 
and outlined new policies, including the liberalization of bilateral restrictions 
on ownership.137  In March 1984, the Commission adopted a second 
memorandum on the airline industry in which it rejected the type of 
deregulation that had recently occurred in the United States on the grounds 
that the European Community (EC) involved a different type of market.138  
The Commission proposed instead that the long-term objective for the EC 
was the creation of a common air transport market.139 
The next set of aviation initiatives, known as the Third Package, was 
adopted in 1992 and became effective on January 1, 1993.  It contained the 
last step in developing a single European aviation market.  The Third 
Package included Council Regulation 2407/92, which set forth requirements 
concerning the issuance of operating licenses by Member States to air 
carriers that were established and operating in the EC.  The adoption of 
Council Regulation 2407/92 entitled Community citizens and organizations 
to operate air carriers throughout the EC without discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality if Community citizens owned and controlled the 
majority of the organization.140 
Due to a number of changes to Council Regulation 2407/92 and other 
regulations relating to airline operations in the European Union, the common 
rules for the operation of air services were recast during 2008 and a new 
regulation, Council Regulation 1008/2008, was issued.  It remains in force 
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today.  Currently, an entity must meet the following conditions, among 
others, in order to obtain an operating license from a Member State:  
 (a) its principal place of business is located in that Member 
State;  
 (b) it holds a valid AOC [Air Operator’s Certificate] issued 
by a national authority of the same Member State whose 
competent licensing authority is responsible for granting, 
refusing, revoking or suspending the operating license of the 
Community air carrier; . . . 
 (f) Member States and/or nationals of Member States own 
more than 50% of the undertaking and effectively control it, 
whether directly or indirectly through one or more intermediate 
undertakings, except as provided for in an agreement with a 
third country to which the Community is a party . . . .141 
Council Regulation 1008/2008 defines the term “effective control” as:  
a relationship constituted by rights, contracts or any other 
means which, either separately or jointly and having regard to 
the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the 
possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive 
influence on an undertaking, in particular by: 
 (a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
 (b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on 
the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an 
undertaking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the 
running of the business of the undertaking.142 
                                                                                                                   
 141 Council Regulation 1008/2008, art. 4, 2008 O.J. (L 293) 3 (EC).  It should be noted that a 
few airlines, which did not meet the Community’s ownership requirements, were granted 
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The EU’s airline ownership and control restrictions are not as stringent as 
the U.S. restrictions de facto.143  An organization complies with the EU’s 
ownership requirements if its principal place of business is located in a 
Member State, nationals of the Member States own more than 50% of the 
entity, and nationals of the Member State control the entity by possessing the 
right to exercise influence over the entity directly or indirectly (e.g., use all 
or some of its assets or having influence over voting or decisions of the 
bodies of the entity or managing the entity’s business).  This standard may 
actually be more stringent than the U.S. standard from a purely de jure 
review. 
While the term “ownership” is not specifically defined in the regulation, a 
European Commission decision from July 19, 1995, in proceedings relating 
to the Swissair/Sabena matter explained that the notion of ownership of an 
entity 
is essentially based on the notion of equity capital.  Holders of 
such capital normally have the right to participate in decisions 
affecting the management of the undertaking as well as to share 
in the residual profits or, in the event of liquidation, in the 
residual assets of the undertaking after all other obligations 
have been met . . . . If, however, capital does not confer upon 
its holders any of the two abovementioned rights to an 
appreciable extent, it must generally be disregarded in 
determining the ownership situation of an undertaking.144 
Although ownership and control requirements will be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, the majority ownership requirement is met, for example, if 
51% of the shares or equity capital of an air carrier is in EU-member hands at 
all times.145  Consequently, non-EU parties may hold 49% of an entity’s 
voting shares or equity capital, and the entity can still meet the EU 
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 144 Commission Decision 95/404, of 19 July 1995 on a Procedure Relating to the 
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ownership requirements.146  This is far more than the 25% limit on voting 
shares set forth in the U.S. ownership and control restrictions.147 
C.  Point of Contention Between the United States and the European Union 
The second stage of the U.S.–EU Open Skies negotiations dealt with 
difficult issues, making that stage of negotiations particularly important.148  
From the EU’s perspective, the foreign ownership and control issue had to be 
addressed.  As it had done before during the first stage, the EU continued to 
demand “unlimited cabotage, unlimited rights for each side’s citizens to own 
and control airlines of the other parties, [and] extensive regulatory 
convergence.”149   
The European Union has long pressed for such reform.  Its position is 
“based on the positive experience [from integrating] the EU internal 
market.”150  During negotiations, the EU asserted that ownership and control 
reform “would represent a key step towards liberating the airline industry 
from the outdated regulatory constraints in the area of foreign investment 
that prevent [the airline industry] from acting like any other industry.”151 
U.S. negotiators, however, knew these goals could not be accomplished 
by the deadline looming over the process.152  The changes considered 
necessary to address the demands of the European Union would require an 
amendment to the U.S. statute limiting foreign ownership and control of 
U.S.-flagged airlines.153  The United States decided to use the second stage 
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of the negotiations to explore the issue of foreign ownership and control.154  
This led to an “examination of the traditional nationality clause in bilateral 
air services agreements.”155 
VI.  CURRENT STATE OF PLAY REGARDING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL 
Rather than directly address the key issue of reforming airline ownership 
and control rules, the 2010 Agreement included a commitment to engage in a 
process toward removing market access barriers and enhancing airlines’ 
access to global capital markets.156  In the end, the EU recognized that 
changes in investment and control must come from the U.S. Congress, and if 
any reform is to be adopted, it will take time.157  Consequently, the 2010 
Agreement sets out incentives that will encourage reform.  For example, 
when the United States changes its legislation to allow EU investors majority 
ownership of U.S. airlines, the EU will reciprocally allow majority 
ownership of U.S. airlines.158  If reform is achieved, U.S. airlines will also 
benefit from additional market access rights to and from the EU.159  The 
parties have also agreed to review progress toward this goal regularly.160  If 
either side fails to make progress on its promises, the other can freeze new 
market access.161  It is unlikely that these incentives alone are sufficient to 
bring about changes to the U.S. ownership and control restrictions.  
Moreover, as discussed below, many issues, including national security, 
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labor, and how to gain congressional support, must be addressed before any 
such reforms will be adopted. 
Article 21 of the 2007 Agreement, as amended by the 2010 Agreement, 
states 
[t]he Parties commit to the shared goal of continuing to remove 
market access barriers in order to maximize benefits for 
consumers, airlines, labour, and communities on both sides of 
the Atlantic, including enhancing the access of their airlines to 
global capital markets, so as better to reflect the realities of a 
global aviation industry, the strengthening of the transatlantic 
air transportation system, and the establishment of a framework 
that will encourage other countries to open up their own air 
service markets . . . . The Joint Committee shall develop a 
process of cooperation in this regard including appropriate 
recommendations to the Parties.162 
The overall outcome of the second-stage negotiations is generally viewed 
as positive.163  The U.S. considers the regime to be a significant step forward 
for the liberalization of aviation access and it provides a solid example of a 
multilateral agreement that opens markets.164  Many remain disappointed, 
however, with the result of the second-stage negotiations and the lack of 
concrete ownership liberalization.165  Stage one critics such as British 
Airways (BA) predicted that the United States would keep the best parts of 
the open skies agreement intact, such as greater access for U.S. airlines to 
BA’s hub at Heathrow, and refute efforts to amend foreign ownership rules 
that the U.S. Congress would have never approved.166  At the end of the 
second-stage negotiations, BA called on the parties to honor their 
commitments and to redouble efforts on the ownership issue going 
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forward.167  IATA, through its former director-general and chief executive, 
Giovanni Bisignani, responded to the second-stage announcement with a 
grim description of the agreement.  Mr. Bisignani noted that IATA was 
disappointed by the parties’ failure to make significant progress on the 
ownership issue and that long-term financial sustainability of the industry is 
dependent on normal commercial freedoms such as those allowing foreign 
investment.168  He also urged the parties to keep the issue on their radar 
screen for urgent follow-up.169 
The EU continues to stress the need for reform of the ownership and 
control restrictions.  In preparation for the ICAO’s Assembly in early 
October 2010, the EU’s Transport Commissioner, Siim Kallas, met with top 
U.S. transportation officials to coordinate on security, environmental, and 
other issues.  When visiting Washington, D.C. for these meetings, the 
Commissioner stated that the EU would continue to push for dismantling the 
investment restrictions that make the aviation sector a global anomaly.170  
A.  U.S. Airlines Denied Access to Foreign Capital 
Not all critics of the U.S. ownership restrictions are European.  Many 
U.S. scholars and entities are critical of the U.S. ownership and control 
restrictions as well.  In fact, even the DOT at one time attempted to modify 
the interpretation of the foreign ownership laws in order to allow foreign 
citizens to control certain aspects of an airline’s operations.171  The purpose 
of the new policy was to encourage new avenues for investment and relieve 
unnecessary constraints on access to capital.172  Many leaders within the 
executive branch and the aviation industry voiced their support for the 
proposal.  Jeffrey Shane, Under Secretary for Policy at the Department, 
defended the proposal when explaining to Congress that “we felt an absolute 
obligation, given the amount of change that has taken place in the airline 
industry, both here and abroad, to reexamine that interpretation and see 
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whether or not, in fact, it continued to have relevance to today’s 
circumstances.”173  John Byerly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Transportation Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, underscored the 
importance of the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement and noted that the two 
parties could “send a message to all the world that the days of protectionist 
bilateral agreements are drawing to a close, and that open markets and airline 
competition represent the future.”174  FedEx’s Rush O’Keefe, Jr., Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel, also testified before Congress in support of 
the new policy, stating that “[t]o withdraw the policy carrot of the NPRM 
would . . . signal an acquiescence to protectionism at a time when U.S. 
carriers want more and not less international opportunities.”175  The Vice 
President of United Airlines, Michael Whitaker explained that U.S. airlines 
“are looking for opportunities to compete more effectively in that world 
market, not for regulatory protection against foreign competition or foreign 
investment.”176 
The DOT’s efforts were not well received by Congress.  It became clear 
during the course of the proceedings that Congress at that time was not 
prepared to amend the foreign ownership statute in order to allow a change in 
Department policy.  The Department ultimately withdrew its proposal.177 
The main argument that opponents of the U.S. ownership regime rely on 
is that the U.S. rules prevent the airline industry from gaining access to 
capital the airlines desperately need for continued operations and to expand 
and modernize their fleets and systems in order to compete with foreign 
airlines in the global market.  As is often pointed out, air carriers require 
significant capital because of their business structures, which involve high 
fixed costs, intensive competition, and highly cyclical demands.178  Even 
though U.S. airlines require significant amounts of capital, U.S. ownership 
and control requirements essentially limit them to depending mostly on the 
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U.S. capital market.179  Since U.S. airlines cannot access foreign capital, they 
struggle to compete with foreign airlines that have greater access to global 
capital markets.180  Given this disadvantage, it is often argued that foreign 
investment would furnish U.S. airlines with the capital they desperately 
require to become financially stable and avoid layoffs of American 
employees.181 
Access to capital is especially important during a downturn in the 
economy, such as the recent recession, when capital is particularly scarce.  
Opponents to the U.S. regime maintain that no other industry in the United 
States is subjected to a similar restriction on foreign investment.  They argue 
that there is no need to submit the U.S. aviation industry to a restraint on 
cross-border investments and that the industry is treated unfairly.  Even 
before this issue came to the foreground in the U.S.–EU Open Skies 
negotiations, some argued that U.S. airlines were going bankrupt as a result 
of not being able to find investment partners that had both sufficient capital 
and the ability to meet the U.S. citizenship requirements.182  Indeed, it was 
estimated in 2005 that approximately one-half of all seats on U.S. airlines 
were on bankrupt air carriers.183 
B.  Airlines Pursue Alternatives to Compete Globally 
1.  Alliances Requiring Antitrust Immunity 
Given the restrictions on foreign investment at this time, U.S. airlines 
continue to rely on alliances for access to global networks.  However, these 
alliances can be costly to an airline to join and maintain.  Similarly, in the 
EU, some observers speculate that one reason the EU allowed the 
postponement of the ownership liberalization issue is that anti-trust 
immunities may currently satisfy immediate EU concerns about market 
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access.184  In fact, strategic alliances requiring antitrust immunity have long 
been utilized as a less-than-perfect substitute for mergers that foreign 
ownership laws prohibit.185  It appears that such alliances will continue to fill 
in as a substitute for access to foreign investment, whether in the form of 
consolidation, the infusion of capital, or both.  As stated in a joint report 
issued by the Department and the Commission, “Since ownership and control 
restrictions will remain to limit the freedom of carriers to merge and given 
that alliances result in significant benefits for carriers, global alliances and 
immunized [Joint Ventures] seem likely to continue to play an important role 
in transatlantic markets.”186  
Alliances requiring antitrust immunity are not the ultimate answer to 
airlines’ woes caused by the inefficient access to capital.  While they can 
provide some benefits for U.S. airlines, such as immediate access to global 
networks, they can be costly to an airline to join and maintain, especially if 
the airline is obligated to update or modify its systems in order to become 
compatible with its alliance partners.  Alliance members can be marginalized 
by other members which seek to retain lucrative, long-haul routes for 
themselves.  In this way, becoming a member of an alliance can actually 
result in limiting the potential for an airline to grow and expand its network.  
Furthermore, only so many U.S. airlines can be in the same alliance before 
fears of anticompetitive domestic effects will prevent other U.S. airlines 
from joining an alliance.  Alliance members may also experience difficulty 
achieving efficiencies otherwise available under a merger such as common 
management, economies of scale/scope, and a combined network. 
2.  Airlines Create New Arrangements 
Since immunized alliances are a less-than-perfect solution for U.S. 
carriers to gain access to additional sources of capital and expand their 
network, airlines have resorted to creating other types of arrangements.  A 
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prime example is the arrangement between Aer Lingus and United Airlines 
(United) pursuant to which these two airlines share costs and revenues in 
regard to one of the city pairs, Washington, D.C.-Madrid, operated under 
their codeshare agreement.  This arrangement has enabled United to offer 
service to its passengers on an Aer Lingus-operated flight carrying the 
United code without either United or Aer Lingus separately incurring all of 
the start-up costs associated with commencing such service in this previously 
underdeveloped market.  Without such an arrangement, neither carrier would 
have commenced service to Madrid on its own.  Under this unique 
arrangement, United has expanded its network while saving costs and 
limiting risks.187 
Joint ventures outside the United States have also been used as a way to 
work around the limitations on foreign investment.  Mesa Airlines, a U.S. 
domestic regional airline, formed a joint venture with Shenzhen Airlines to 
start a new regional airline in the Chinese market.188  By teaming up with 
Shenzhen Airlines on a project outside the United States, Mesa Airlines has 
extended its reach without relying on direct foreign investment in its U.S. 
entity.189 
Consolidation among U.S. domestic carriers has become a substitute for 
greater access to foreign capital.  Most recently, the industry has witnessed 
the Northwest/Delta merger together with the United/Continental merger.  
These mergers occurred not long after the US Airways/America West 
merger.  Unable to expand networks on their own in order to compete with 
other airlines, U.S. air carriers have resorted to mergers with other U.S. 
carriers in order to obtain economies of scale and benefit from a combined 
network. 
At one point, air carriers also used a methodology where ownership 
interests held by a foreign investment entity were “multiplied out” to 
represent the total beneficial foreign ownership of a domestic airline.190  If 
                                                                                                                   
 187 David Kaminski-Morrow, United, Aer Lingus to Tie up on Washington–Madrid Route, 
FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/01/22/321495/ 
united-aer-lingus-to-tie-up-on-washington-madrid-route.html. 
 188 David Grossman, Airlines Get Creative to Skirt Foreign Ownership Rules, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/columnist/grossman/2009-10-06-multinationa 
l-airlines_N.htm. 
 189 Id. 
 190 BRUCE KEINER, JR. ET AL., AIRLINE ALLIANCES, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND MERGERS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 12 (2009), available at http://www.crowell.com/documents/airline-allianc 
es-antitrust-immunity-and-mergers-in-the-us.pdf. 
2011] U.S.–EU SECOND STAGE AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT  703 
 
 
the foreign investors’ interests were genuinely passive, and highly dispersed, 
a U.S. LLC could be inserted between the air carrier and each foreign 
investment entity.191  This structure was used in connection with Hawaiian 
Airline’s emergence from bankruptcy because the reorganized airline 
involved an ownership structure that included foreign investment entities, 
and under the Department’s traditional application of the citizenship 
requirements, Hawaiian would not have passed the U.S. citizen test.192   
Under what became known as the “Hawaiian approach” or “Hawaiian 
structure,” the new LLC owns and controls the voting stock in the air carrier 
(or its parent), and independent U.S. managers who have a genuine financial 
interest must hold all the voting interest in the new LLC.193  If foreign 
investors hold any remaining interest, it must be non-voting.194  The DOT 
accepted this approach in recognition of the fact that the foreign ownership 
restrictions “imposed harmful burdens on U.S. carrier access to investment 
capital.”195  The approach was acceptable if “the U.S. managers are in fact 
independent decision makers and are not obliged to follow the dictates of the 
offshore entities that they manage with respect to [the air carrier], whether 
because of fiduciary duty or any other reason.”196   
The Department’s application of the Hawaiian approach is not often seen 
in public documents.197  It did appear, however, in Virgin America’s 
application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, where the 
Department initially found that Virgin America could not use the Hawaiian 
approach, but later decided to apply that standard and determined that Virgin 
America was owned and controlled by U.S. citizens once Virgin America 
altered its ownership and management structure.198  Both the Hawaiian and 
Virgin America matters demonstrate that U.S. carriers will resort to the 
“multiplying-out approach” in order to obtain access to foreign capital. 
Minority ownership probably will also continue to be a substitute for 
increased access to the global capital markets.199  Lufthansa’s 19% 
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investment in jetBlue provides access to capital for jetBlue and allows 
Lufthansa to expand its U.S. route network by connecting with jetBlue’s 
flights at jetBlue’s New York Kennedy Airport hub.200  As long as access to 
foreign capital remains restricted, U.S. carriers will be constrained to work 
around the U.S. citizenship requirements. 
VII.  WHAT’S NEXT FOR OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
A.  Broader Liberalization 
1.  Potential Benefits 
The United States has agreements with more than 100 Open Skies 
partners, all of which contain citizenship requirements in the form of 
nationality clauses.201  While the United States continues to move forward 
with efforts to conclude more open skies agreements with additional trading 
partners, including China, Mexico, and South Africa, some believe it is time 
to seek broader liberalization under existing and future bilaterals.202  
Proponents of further liberalization would relax or eliminate altogether 
restrictions in the nationality clause, ownership and control restrictions, and 
cabotage prohibitions, allowing all freedoms of the air.203  They envision a 
completely free global market, such as exists in many other industries.204  
Proponents cite to the great potential for all stakeholders, including 
passengers, shippers, airlines, labor, and airports.205  Relaxing nationality 
clauses, ownership and control restrictions, and allowing cabotage, for 
example, could result in expanded networks and greater competition among 
airlines.206  The effect would be better service, lower fares for passengers, 
cheaper rates for shippers, and, of course, access to the global capital 
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market.207  Air transport services could increase in general, benefitting 
airports and creating more jobs in all aspects of the aviation industry.208 
2.  Potential Risks 
However, many opponents to greater liberalization fear the opposite will 
occur.209  They are concerned that eliminating restrictions will result in 
shrinking networks with fewer service options available to passengers and 
shippers.  They predict that competition among airlines would only remain in 
high-demand markets and that service to markets where there is less demand 
would be reduced or eliminated.  Opponents also argue that if ownership and 
control restrictions are relaxed, foreign airlines will gain greater ownership 
rights in U.S. airlines and consolidate them with foreign airlines.210  They 
claim that more consolidation will also result in less service and less 
competition since there will be fewer carriers.211  With increased foreign 
involvement, these carriers would not necessarily have U.S. interests in 
mind.  There is also apprehension that American employees in U.S. aviation 
markets would be replaced with foreign employees who will accept lower 
wages and are not as well trained or experienced compared to their American 
counterparts.  The quality and safety in air transport services would suffer.  
Security issues would also arise, since the U.S. government relies on service 
from airlines in national security emergencies through the Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) program.  There is a concern that U.S. airlines owned and 
controlled by foreign nationals would not support the United States during a 
national emergency. 
B.  Solutions for Obstacles to Deeper Liberalization 
While many obstacles must be overcome before embarking on efforts to 
increase liberalization, commentators have offered potential solutions.  The 
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following sets forth some of those solutions.  In addition to foreign 
ownership and control and labor issues, other items demanding the United 
States’ and the European Union’s attention are lurking on the horizon, 
including streamlined visa/facilitation provisions, enhanced and harmonized 
aviation security measures and capacity limits resulting from airport/air 
traffic constraints, and greenhouse gas rules.212 
1.  Legislation 
Undoubtedly, the main obstacle to increased liberalization on the U.S. 
side is the current U.S. statute restricting foreign ownership and control of 
U.S. airlines.213  When the Department first announced its intent in late 2005 
to change U.S. policy in order to allow foreign citizens to control certain 
aspects of a U.S. airline’s operations,214 some Members of Congress strongly 
opposed the initiative, arguing that Congress first had to act to amend the 
statute before the Department could change any policy.215   
The political climate at that time would not allow any room for foreign 
influence over domestic air carrier operations.  At roughly the same time that 
the debate on increased foreign involvement in airline operations was taking 
place on Capitol Hill, a perceived scandal involving the sale of U.S. port 
facilities to Dubai Port World, a United Arab Emirates entity, was also 
playing out in Congress.216  At a time when the United States was debating 
how to protect its ports and prevent containers with dirty bombs from 
entering its territory, legislators were troubled to learn that the Bush 
Administration approved a transaction they thought would put U.S. national 
security interests at U.S. ports in the hands of foreign nationals.  When 
members of Congress also learned that the Bush Administration was 
attempting to allow foreign nationals to control certain aspects of U.S. 
airlines’ operations, they were equally concerned.  During hearings held by 
the House of Representatives Aviation Subcommittee, many Representatives, 
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including Representative Oberstar, opposed the Department’s proposal and 
argued that the Department lacked authority to modify its policy on control 
without Congressional action.217  Many Representatives took a harsh stance 
on national security as midterm elections were approaching.218  As the State 
Department’s John Byerly, the lead negotiator at the time for the United 
States for its air transport agreements, later explained, the Department’s 
attempt to change its policy 
ran into a firestorm of opposition in the United States, based on 
national security concerns and homeland security concerns.  It 
was eventually melded into the huge battle over the Dubai 
Ports controversy in the United States.  And after a full year 
and plenty of battle scars to show for it, the Administration has 
decided this simply is not going to work . . . . It’s not politically 
possible at this time.219 
It had become clear that any change in approach concerning foreign 
ownership and control matters would have to be accepted by Congress.220 
Liberalization proponents have long advocated that Congress should relax 
the U.S. law that restricts ownership and control of U.S. airlines.221  Some 
argue that such Congressional action is necessary to fully implement the 
open skies program, facilitate investment in U.S. air carriers, help ensure the 
long-term financial health of the U.S. aviation industry, and guarantee that 
U.S carriers remain competitive.222  While proponents of full liberalization 
offer various approaches for relaxing ownership restrictions, most seem to 
agree that certain conditions should be met before foreign investors enjoy 
increased involvement with U.S. airlines.223  For example, they would favor 
legislation that permits unlimited foreign voting and nonvoting equity 
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investment in U.S. airlines by citizens of countries that afford reciprocal 
investment opportunities for U.S. citizens in their air carriers.224  This would 
provide an incentive for protectionist countries to relax their foreign 
ownership restrictions.225  They suggest suspending foreign ownership and 
control restrictions on a nation-by-nation basis through bilateral or 
multilateral air transport agreements once legislation is adopted.226 
Another condition would be to relax U.S. ownership and control 
restrictions only as part of the open skies program.227  Foreign nations would 
be required to adopt the key elements of the open skies program and 
incorporate them into the country’s air transport agreement with the United 
States.228  This condition would encourage more nations to liberalize their 
overall air transport policies and bring them in line with the open skies 
approach.229 
A third condition would be to allow only those trusted individuals or 
entities that are not owned, controlled, or subsidized by foreign governments 
to invest in and help manage U.S. airlines.230  This would ensure that foreign, 
government-influenced, and government-subsidized air carriers would not 
operate in the U.S. market and obtain an unfair competitive advantage.231 
While Congressional action is viewed as the primary obstacle to deeper 
liberalization within the aviation industry, it is uncertain whether Congress is 
ready to amend U.S. law.232  As occurred during the Department’s attempt to 
change its policy on foreign nationals controlling some aspects of U.S. 
airline’s operations, Members of Congress may remain concerned about 
political backlash from their constituents, especially those who are union 
members or who fear that service to small communities will be cancelled if 
foreign nationals are involved in management decisions.233  Members of 
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Congress may also want to avoid appearing weak on national security issues 
and preventing foreign interests from becoming involved in U.S. business. 
To overcome these challenges, some have suggested that the U.S. airline 
industry, executive agencies, non-governmental policy, and academic 
communities work more closely with Congress to educate legislators on 
investment issues affecting carriers, including the unique nature of the 
industry and the need for access to global capital.234  Many Members of 
Congress do not appreciate the effect that the U.S. ownership restriction has 
on the U.S. aviation industry or what the economic impact could be if the 
statute was amended.  To do this, however, there must be greater consensus 
among airlines as to exactly how far Congress should go in relaxing the 
ownership and control restriction.  
2.  Security Issues 
The widely accepted belief that relaxing foreign investment restrictions 
would result in an increased threat to national security is another significant 
obstacle to ownership reform.235  Recall that national security concerns stem 
primarily from the Defense Department’s (DoD) fear that allowing foreign 
ownership and control of U.S. air carriers would result in an inability to rely 
on U.S. carriers for airlift service during military emergencies under the 
CRAF program,236 and that “international political developments could 
create conflicts of interest that undermine an airline’s commitments to 
CRAF.”237  For example, foreign owners may receive requests or orders from 
their foreign government that contradict DoD orders. 
Proponents of deeper liberalization, however, have suggested several 
approaches for resolving this issue.  First, they point out that, according to a 
study requested by the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Transportation Policy and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, 
“[i]f strong risk-management safeguards were adopted, DoD could 
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effectively manage the CRAF program to meet national security 
requirements, even if the US government were to raise the current ceiling on 
foreign ownership and control.”238  Further, liberalization proponents 
underscore DoD’s current use of foreign flag air carriers for military 
transport, its explicit policy permitting reliance on such carriers, and 
extensive use of foreign-owned container lines for transport by sea, to 
undermine DoD’s position regarding foreign ownership and control of U.S. 
air carriers.239  They also observe that U.S. air carriers owned or controlled 
by foreign nationals could be required to remain or become U.S.-flagged, 
rendering them subject to all U.S. laws, including those statutes that penalize 
airlines for failure to fulfill their CRAF obligations.240  Penalties could be 
severe enough to require performance even in the face of contradictory 
requirements from a foreign government.  And, to mitigate any impact on 
diplomatic relations, DoD could rely on obligations contained in the 
contractual agreements to guarantee participation in the CRAF program, 
including termination in the event that the U.S. carrier did not comply with 
its CRAF obligations.241  In addition, the Department could revoke the 
airline’s operating certificate. 
DoD could also require a foreign-owned airline to provide a standby letter 
of credit that would be payable to DoD if the airline does not meet its CRAF 
obligations.242  Standby letters of credit are used to insure or guarantee 
performance of obligations on the part of a seller of a service or goods.243  
Some have also suggested that foreign investment could only be 
permitted in accordance with a mutual protection pact.244  Foreign 
investment in U.S. airlines would only be allowed if the investor is from a 
country with which the United States has entered into an accord “in which 
the parties agree to render mutual aid in the event of armed attack on one of 
the parties.”245  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides an example 
of such an accord.246  The ANZUS treaty with Australia is another 
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example.247  Other such treaties exist with Japan, South Korea, and the 
Philippines.248  Some countries from the western hemisphere are parties to 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.249  Under a mutual 
protection regime, nationals from Australia, Japan, South Korea, the 
Philippines, many western hemisphere countries, and NATO countries—
including Canada, Turkey, and much of Europe—would be eligible to invest 
in U.S. air carriers.250 
3.  Labor Issues 
U.S. labor unions are generally opposed to relaxing foreign ownership 
restrictions.  Opposition stems primarily from fear that foreign owners and 
managers of U.S. airlines would replace U.S. employees with employees 
from their home countries251 or cheap, unqualified labor from third countries.  
Liberalization proponents argue that this concern is unwarranted.  They look 
to similar U.S. industries that are not subject to foreign ownership 
restrictions and assert that foreign investment did not have a detrimental 
effect on American jobs.252  Proponents further assert that liberalization of 
the ownership and control restrictions would permit additional investment in 
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U.S. airlines and prevent job losses.253  With access to foreign capital, U.S. 
airlines would become more competitive and gain better financial health.  
They would not have to resort to layoffs in order to save on costs.  
Liberalization supporters also assert that protectionist measures will only 
result in weakening U.S. companies and increase, rather than mitigate, the 
threat to U.S. jobs.254  They claim that access to foreign capital would help 
U.S. airlines grow and expand their domestic and international networks, 
help them compete with so-called “foreign super carriers,” and remain viable 
U.S. employers.255  By way of additional measures to ensure U.S. jobs are 
protected, liberalization proponents suggest that the government require that 
all or a certain portion of the airline crew of a foreign-owned, U.S.-flagged 
airline be composed of U.S. citizens.256  
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), in particular, is opposed to 
liberalization of the ownership restrictions on the grounds that its members 
would be negatively impacted because U.S. labor laws do not cover foreign 
airlines.257  ALPA also insists that there would be a “race to the bottom” in 
regard to treatment and protection of airline employees because airlines will 
attempt to evade strict labor laws by transforming themselves into foreign 
corporations.258  According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
however, U.S. laws and regulations applicable to U.S. carriers and collective 
bargaining agreements between employees and the airlines prevent foreign 
investors from evading requirements under U.S. labor laws.259  Further, even 
though U.S. airlines may become owned or controlled by foreign investors, 
they would be obligated to remain U.S.-flagged airlines in order to continue 
operating in the U.S. domestic market.260  Such U.S.-flag carriers are subject 
to U.S. labor laws. 
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ALPA has also argued that increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines 
could lead to consolidation and airlines operating long haul routes would use 
foreign crews.261  This would force U.S. airlines to reduce international 
service, shrinking opportunities for U.S. crews to operate these coveted 
routes that provide an opportunity to earn higher wages.262  Liberalization 
proponents respond that if the domestic market is opened up to allow free 
entry, airlines will expand international service because it represents the best 
opportunity for profit.263  They predict that international service would not 
decrease enough to cause job loss for U.S. crews.264   
In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has proposed that a 
foreign carrier acquiring a U.S. carrier could be required to ensure that the 
U.S. airline will retain the same percentage of combined total available seat 
miles that it had as of a date six months prior to announcing the 
acquisition.265  The ABA has also suggested that the U.S. government and 
the relevant foreign governments establish a legal framework containing fair 
procedures to regulate labor representation and collective bargaining on 
multinational airline systems.266 
Before Negotiations for the 2010 Agreement were underway, the 
European Commission held two aviation forums on liberalization and labor 
in order to facilitate discussions between stakeholders and decision makers 
on labor issues linked to the U.S.–EU agreement.267  These forums were 
organized through the support of labor organizations in both the United 
States and the European Union.268  Over seventy individuals from U.S. and 
EU Member State Governments, unions, European and U.S. airlines, 
academia, labor experts, and officials from the European Commission 
participated in the forums.269 
During the forums, employee representatives voiced their concerns with 
the 2007 Agreement and efforts to negotiate and conclude the 2010 
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Agreement.  The main concern held by pilot representatives, for example, 
related to the impact that ownership and control reforms would have on 
employee and union rights in trans-national operations.270  For labor, the 
problem was that operations under the multilateral agreement would affect 
rights airline employees at the national level traditionally enjoyed—that is—
the right to collectively organize, negotiate, agree, and enforce agreements at 
the company level.271  They questioned how these rights could be protected 
for workers employed in the United States and European airline companies 
based in more than one country.272  According to European labor groups, this 
issue arose within Europe as commercial freedoms granted to airlines were 
not matched by developments in social protection, which, to complicate 
matters, are based in Europe on differing national regimes.273 
A number of different approaches for ensuring employee representation 
in a trans-national environment were discussed.  One approach was the use 
of trans-national agreements dealing with social matters in trans-national 
companies, such as agreements struck between airlines and their 
employees.274  It was noted that these voluntary agreements are common at 
the global and European level, but there lacks a clear international legal 
framework for their enforcement.275  Additionally, while they frame broad 
principles of the employee–employer relationship at the company level, 
national-level agreements between employees and their employers address 
the details.276  The scope of these agreements is narrow as well and many 
merely address consultation procedures during a company’s restructuring.277 
Next, some of the forum attendees suggested that a multinational 
convention on the rights of airline workers could be a way forward.278  This 
approach would address the need for harmonized national labor standards for 
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aviation workers.279  A multinational convention has addressed similar issues 
in the maritime industry and the forum examined that industry’s experience 
in this area.280  Participants in the maritime industry reported on recent 
updates and revisions to the Maritime Labor Convention and the need to 
tackle the problem of inadequate standards.  They explained that what 
became the Maritime Labor Convention of 2006 (MLC) established a new 
set of basic standards that all members of the International Labor 
Organisation (ILO) must apply.281  According to the presenters, the MLC 
covers minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a vessel, conditions 
of employment, hours of work and rest, wages, leave, repatriation, 
accommodations, recreational facilities, food and catering, occupational 
safety and health protection, medical care, welfare, and social security 
protection.282  For them, enforcement of the standards remains an issue and 
much of that responsibility is placed upon port authorities to inspect a 
vessel’s certification.283  However, it was noted that, for the most part, the 
MLC is viewed as a positive step for those employed in the maritime 
industry.  The presenters further explained that the MLC’s implementation is 
still being closely monitored.284  While the MLC could be examined further 
when considering whether a multinational convention on airline workers’ 
rights would be a viable solution, the maritime model may not be an exact 
fit.  Many of labor’s concerns, such as flags of convenience have not been 
adequately addressed in the maritime industry. 
How to ensure common labor standards was further addressed.  
Approaches to establishing common standards can vary in form, including 
unenforceable policies or declarations, as well as treaties, which are 
enforceable.285  It was stressed that involvement of the relevant unions was 
essential to the process.286  Scandinavian Airlines’ (S.A.S.) experience was 
examined as it was underscored as successful in securing common standards 
across the company since its creation in the 1950s.  S.A.S. used a single 
contract that was enforceable under Swedish law and had been in operation 
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through three rounds of restructuring since the late 1970s.287  One 
commentator also pointed out during this discussion that the emphasis should 
be on the quality as well as the quantity of jobs when establishing common 
labor standards.288 
A final approach examined during the forums was the convergence of 
labor law.  In particular, participants examined the steps that would be 
required to ensure convergence in the labor laws of the parties to a treaty.  
Practical and political obstacles were addressed.  A forum participant from 
the EC’s Legal Service emphasized that the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement 
expressly excluded certain areas of social policy from action at the EU level, 
including pay, right of association, social security, and the right to strike.289  
Consequently, the EC could not table proposals on any such issues unless 
jointly with the Member States.290 
A representative from the European Cockpit Association (ECA) noted 
that the ECA is a strong supporter of regulatory convergence as a means of 
improving standards in the industry in the areas of security, safety, and 
economic regulation and that a similar approach could work for social 
matters.291  The main issue, however, was ensuring recognition of existing 
arrangements such as negotiated collective bargaining agreements.292  He 
stated that when combined with information sharing and a common set of 
labor standards, there should be a basis for an effective and sustainable 
dialogue between employees and employers. 
An ALPA representative added that granting greater commercial freedom 
to airlines should not dilute the protections offered to workers.293  According 
to ALPA, the best way to approach this issue was to provide for a single 
labor law in Europe based on the provisions of the U.S. Railway Labor Act, 
which provides clear procedures for the selection of bargaining 
representatives, a clear negotiation framework, a dispute resolution 
procedure, and a clear enforcement mechanism.294  The bottom line for 
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ALPA was protecting four fundamental rights: the ability to organize, 
negotiate, agree, and enforce collectively.295 
In terms of moving forward, a number of groups developed 
methodologies for incorporating social considerations into the second stage 
of the EU–U.S. negotiations.296  The formulas varied, but all suggested that 
the 2010 Agreement should include the four fundamental rights underscored 
by ALPA.  The EC and other participants agreed to develop these and other 
ideas for inclusion in the 2010 Agreement.297 
While the 2010 Agreement does not include precise terms guaranteeing 
the four fundamental rights suggested by certain attendees at the EC labor 
forums, it does include a new article pursuant to which parties agree to be 
guided by principles that do not undermine labor related rights.298  Further, 
the Joint Committee, on which both ECA and ALPA have a seat, is 
empowered to “develop appropriate responses to concerns found to be 
legitimate.”299  In addition, in the Memorandum of Consultations relating to 
the 2010 Agreement, the EC acknowledges challenges related to 
representation of cross-border mobility of workers and commits to informing 
the Joint Committee about initiatives to improve implementation, 
application, and enforcement in this area.300  In this way, the 2010 
Agreement recognizes labor representatives’ concerns associated with 
liberalizing the aviation industry.301  ECA noted that it knows of no other air 
transport agreement that includes such far-reaching social protections. 
According to the ECA, the clauses ultimately incorporated into the 2010 
Agreement ensure that growth flowing from the agreement’s benefits 
employees as well as consumers.302  However, they argue that appropriate 
tools still do not exist to allow airlines to operate in accordance with a clear, 
unduplicated set of rules and to prevent airlines from playing one set of 
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standards against another, promoting a race to the bottom in regard to 
employment protection.303  As currently structured, the arrangement permits 
airlines to exploit differences in employment regulation.304  While ECA 
acknowledged that the 2007 Agreement and the 2010 Agreement are both 
successful and groundbreaking in many ways, “they are not complete and 
will eventually fail unless we follow up with complementary regulatory 
changes.”305 
While ALPA appreciates the work that the U.S. and EU negotiators 
undertook in exploring and attempting to address labor’s concerns during the 
second stage negotiations, ALPA remains cautious as to how the clauses on 
labor rights will be applied.306  In the meantime, however, ALPA views these 
new provisions as a promising and meaningful development; the provisions 
should serve as a model for similar terms to be included in other air service 
agreements.307  ALPA also appreciated the fact that the 2010 Agreement 
amended Article 21 of the 2007 Agreement by setting up a process for 
addressing the possibility of removing market access barriers.308  ALPA 
approves of the new Article 21 allowing careful consideration of the 
implications of further removal of market access barriers and changes to 
labor and other laws.309  
Any attempt to liberalize foreign ownership restrictions may have to 
include protective labor provisions to be politically viable.  Some supporters 
of broader liberalization acknowledge that labor must be fully included in the 
liberalization process.  By participating fully in negotiations, discussions, 
and the adoption of specific measures, labor may become supportive of 
certain aspects of liberalization, particularly if assurances concerning job 
preservation are included in the process.  Providing access to capital and 
improving the financial health of U.S. airlines will have to be done in a way 
to ensure that all stakeholders, including U.S. labor, benefit from the result. 
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4.  Multilateral Approaches 
  a.  The Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International 
Air Transportation 
Some observers suggest that recent accomplishments in the form of the 
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement serve as a model for additional multilateral 
agreements involving broader liberalization.  They also point to the 
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air 
Transportation (MALIAT) and IATA’s Agenda for Freedom as evidence of 
other concerted efforts to advance liberalization.310  The U.S. joined Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in forming the MALIAT in 
2001.311  MALIAT was among the first multilateral air transport agreements 
to include open skies provisions and appeared to deepen liberalization.312  
One of MALIAT’s provisions states that the parties will grant authorizations 
to an airline designated by one of the other parties to provide international 
service, as long as it is incorporated and has its principal place of business in 
the territory of another party and “effective control of that airline is vested in 
the designating Party, its nationals, or both.”313  Notably absent from 
MALIAT’s conditions for obtaining authorization to serve another party’s 
territory is the requirement that nationals of the designating party actually 
own the airline.314  While MALIAT also sets forth a provision stating that 
nothing in the agreement will be deemed to affect a party’s ownership and 
control laws, thus preserving the U.S. ownership and control regime, it is 
significant that the United States executed an agreement that does not 
necessarily require an airline to be owned by a party’s nationals in order to 
operate under the agreement.315  Like the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement, 
MALIAT serves as a model multilateral agreement that could be used for 
pursuing deeper liberalization. 
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  b.  IATA’s Statement of Policy Principles Regarding the 
Implementation of Bilateral Air Services Agreements 
In 2008, IATA developed its Agenda for Freedom, which is a process 
focused on encouraging governments around the world to grant airlines the 
commercial freedom to operate like any other global business.316  IATA’s 
Director General and CEO at the time, Giovanni Bisignani, launched the 
initiative at IATA’s Annual General Meeting held in Istanbul in June 
2008.317  At that meeting, attendees adopted what is known as the Istanbul 
Declaration, which calls for a change to rules that limit the foreign ownership 
of airlines.318  Given the crisis in existence at that time in terms of fuel costs, 
limited access to capital, and the overall aviation industry’s poor financial 
health, IATA determined it was incumbent upon it, as the industry’s global 
association, to create a process to encourage governments to allow airlines to 
operate like any other business.319  IATA found that an Agenda for Freedom 
was necessary because airlines are required to conduct business under a web 
of bilateral Government-to-Government treaties that are out of date with 
commercial realities.320  IATA found that the treaties severely restrict cross 
border consolidation through restrictive ownership and control clauses, 
which have a direct effect on the industry’s poor financial performance over 
time.321  According to IATA, if the airline industry was financially healthy, it 
would be in a much better position to fuel economic growth and job 
creation.322 
Fifteen governments and the European Commission were invited to 
participate in what became the Istanbul Summit held later that year in 
October 2008.323  It was also open to any other country desiring to engage in 
the process of liberalizing ownership and control rules.324  Representatives 
from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Commission, India, 
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab 
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Emirates, United States, and Vietnam attended the Summit.325  During the 
Summit, Mr. Bisignani circulated a paper proposing ways in which 
governments can provide airlines more commercial freedom to adapt to a 
rapidly changing business environment.326  One proposal was for countries to 
unilaterally waive, but not revoke, key clauses in the bilaterals that prevent 
airlines from enjoying commercial freedom, primarily in the area of 
ownership and control clauses and traffic rights clauses.327  Participating 
countries would only suspend the clauses they choose with the country or 
countries they choose either on a conditional and/or reciprocal basis.328  The 
proposal’s goal was to create rapid progress on liberalization while at the 
same time providing assurances for countries that they would remain in 
control of their own liberalization efforts.329   
Another proposal discussed at the Istanbul Summit was to create a 
multilateral treaty on waiving nationality clauses in existing bilateral 
agreements.330  While similar to the first proposal, it used a different legal 
instrument.331  It also did not include mechanisms to eliminate limitations on 
market access.   
A third proposal, to draft a multilateral statement of policy principles, 
also emerged.332  The principles would commit signatory governments to 
apply existing and future bilateral agreements in a liberal manner in 
exchange for their bilateral partners doing the same.333  Certain summit 
participants preferred this approach to the waiver approach because it gave 
them more control over the degree of liberalization and their choice of 
partners.334  At the conclusion of the Istanbul Summit, the participants agreed 
that further liberalization would be desirable and that they should consider 
the three proposals.335 
After the Istanbul Summit, IATA conducted economic studies on the 
impact of liberalization and researched best practices for liberalization from 
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around the world.336  It also prepared an initial draft of what became the 
Statement of Policy Principles regarding the Implementation of Bilateral Air 
Services Agreements (Statement of Policy Principles).337  According to 
IATA, the goal of the Statement of Policy Principles was to call on countries 
to apply the terms of the existing bilateral agreements, and negotiate new 
agreements, in a liberal manner.  IATA coordinated with the Istanbul 
Summit participants on developing the draft Statement of Policy Principles 
so that it would be acceptable to the maximum number of countries 
committed to liberalization.338 
Mr. Bisignani organized a second Agenda for Freedom summit, which 
was held in Montebello, Canada in November 2009.339  Those governments 
that indicated their willingness to endorse the Statement of Policy Principles 
were invited to attend the Montebello Summit.  Chile, the European 
Commission, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, United Arab 
Emirates, and the United States participated in this second summit, and all 
but the European Commission signed the final version of the Statement of 
Policy Principles.  The European Commission endorsed it.340 
The Statement of Policy Principles addresses four main areas.  The first is 
freedom to access capital markets.  Signatory countries agreed not to 
exercise bilateral rights to block international service from airlines with non-
national ownership structures.341  The second main area is the freedom to do 
business.  Participating governments agreed to focus on reducing restrictions 
on market access and to expedite further opening of markets in future 
bilateral agreements.342  The freedom to price services is also addressed.  
Under this freedom, signatory countries agreed to focus on allowing greater 
freedom for airlines to price services in line with market realities.343  The last 
main area addressed is the need for fair competition.  Participating countries 
agreed that the parties could not be expected to implement the foregoing 
principles with governments that pursue policies designed to secure an 
unlevel playing field for their national carriers.344  According to IATA, the 
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Statement of Policy Principles is a significant document that can be effective 
because governments have adopted these principles in an official capacity, 
and it will form the basis for bilateral negotiations.345 
The Statement of Policy Principles is open to the endorsement of any 
government interested in promoting liberalization.346  IATA and the 
signatory countries promote the Statement of Policy Principles around the 
world, and IATA has held regional workshops for such purposes and to seek 
additional endorsements.347  So far, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Qatar 
have joined the original Montebello Summit Participants by either signing or 
endorsing the Statement of Policy Principles.348 
The IATA Agenda for Freedom provides another vehicle to move 
forward on a multilateral basis and broaden liberalization principles even 
further.  However, as long as the participating countries’ domestic laws 
restrict airline ownership and control, such as those of the United States, the 
multilateral approach for liberalization will remain limited or simply move 
forward and leave behind those countries unwilling to liberalize their 
regimes.  It is possible that increased competition from, and success enjoyed 
by, more liberal countries’ airlines will pressure legislators in the United 
States and similar countries to consider adopting modifications to the 
ownership and control restrictions in order to allow their airlines the same 
freedoms. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
International air transport systems are critical to modern economies, and 
the U.S.–EU trans-Atlantic market has always been a market leader.  The 
2007 Agreement and 2010 Agreement were significant steps forward in 
providing a more efficient, more effective, and more stable air transport 
system.  While moving forward on the remaining obstacles to a true open 
aviation area may be difficult, the required hard work and continuing 
negotiations are certainly worthwhile.  U.S. aviation policy was during my 
time as Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs and 
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continues to be based upon three main goals.  First, to ensure in the short 
term that the system is able to function efficiently and meet the economic 
and security needs of the nation.  Second, over the long term to promote 
open international markets, fair competition, and minimal government 
intervention in markets.  And, third, to establish common international 
standards that will ensure a safe, efficient, and environmentally sound global 
transportation system.  The pursuit of such goals has not come easy, and the 
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement is a remarkable achievement.  With the 
approval of the Agreement these three goals have advanced. 
Obviously, however, issues have and will continue to arise which hinder 
progress and challenge our resolve to achieve further liberalization.  The 
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement has established fruitful efforts under the 
U.S.–EU Joint Committee, and perhaps defined a prudent manner in which 
to move forward toward convergence in areas such as safety, security, and 
interoperability and compatibility of air traffic systems.  Genuine 
possibilities exist for advancing larger issues, such as foreign ownership and 
control of air carriers.  Eventually, the market will demand that this issue be 
resolved.  What I said at the opening of the Dean Rusk Center conference in 
2003 on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship remains true today: 
Industries of all kinds are moving toward more open and 
vigorous global competition as consumers demand new 
services and products.  Participation in such a dynamic world 
economy can pose huge challenges as well as opportunities for 
both individuals and industries.  The most promising way 
forward is to continue to rise to the challenge of competition in 
the international marketplace.  North Americans and 
Europeans, like other peoples, can and must compete, not 
retreat, in the face of global competition.  You cannot reap the 
benefits of free trade if you cannot move people and goods 
freely.349 
In such an environment it is imperative that the aviation industry and 
governments continue to review and revise the trans-Atlantic air transport 
market.  We have begun to replace the isolated bilateral aviation markets that 
were created under the existing system of the Chicago Convention.  We must 
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now continue to work toward a true single, open, worldwide aviation market 
for the twenty-first century; and, in doing so, ensure that all stakeholders 
participate in the economic benefits of such a vibrant market. 
